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Abstract 
Neural models have proposed how short-term memory (STM) storage in working memory and 
long-term memory (L TM) storage and recall are linked and interact, but are realized by different 
mechanisms that obey different laws. The authors' data can be understood in the light of these 
models, which suggest that the authors may have gone too far in obscuring the differences 
between these processes. 
COMMENTARY 
Ruchkin et al. argue against the idea that STM and L TM are realized by different systems, and 
that "long-term memory and short-term memory are different states of the same representations, 
with activated representations in long-term memory constituting all of short-term memory" (p. 
3). This claim is restated in various ways; e.g., "short-term memory maintenance of the items 
consists of reactivation of the long-term memory representations" (p. 33). I suggest that these 
claims are not entirely true, even though they overcome an even greater error. Three decades of 
neural modeling of behavioral and brain data about STM and LTM (e.g., Bradski et al., 1994; 
Brown et al., 1999; Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991; Fiala, et al., 1996; Grossberg, 1968, 1980, 
1982, 1987, 1988, 1999; Grossberg and Myers, 2000; Page, 2000; Grossberg and Williamson, 
2001) suggest that STM and L TM are intimately linked, but embody different organizational 
principles, are realized by different mechanisms, and obey different laws. Available models 
clarifY cellular neural mechanisms of STM/L TM and their integration into brain systems, 
including how STM per se differs fi:om prefrontal working memory that can temporarily store 
multiple events and their order in STM. 
STM involves activation of cells that receive signals from axons whose synapses contain 
adaptive weights which encode L TM. Suitable (but not all) cell activations in STM can lead to 
learning and LTM within abutting synapses whose axons are active at that time (associative 
learning). Later activation of these axons can read out L TM into cellular STM activations. 
Although this description clarifies why STM and LTM are closely linked, it does not completely 
support the authors' claim that "long-term memory and short-term memmy are different states of 
the same representations." To see this, imagine that two different sets of cells read-out their L TM 
into the same target cells at different times. Then the STM patterns that develop will be different. 
STM combines L TM read-out from multiple cells into a composite STM pattern. Moreover, 
"shmi-term memory maintenance of the items" does not necessarily consist "of reactivation of 
the long-term memory representations." STM can be maintained by recurrent interactions that 
are different from those which read out LTM. Indeed, a key role for working memory is to 
temporarily store an unfamiliar sequence of events before learning can chunk it into a new LTM 
representation. 
Working memories cannot work well unless they operate at correctly defined processing levels 
and obey correctly constrained laws. Many experiments support the proposal that a working 
memory represents sequences of items that have individually been unitized through prior learning 
experiences. Familiar feature clusters that are presented within a brief time interval become items 
by being categorized, or unitized, in LTM at a processing stage that occurs before the working 
memory stage. As item categories are processed through time, they input to a working memory 
where multiple items are simultaneously stored as pari of an evolving spatial pattern of activation 
across a network of item representations. This spatial pattern represents both item information 
(which items are stored) and temporal order information (the order in which they are stored). 
Individual items can be recalled when a rehearsal wave nonspecifically activates the entire 
working memory. The rehearsal wave allows the most active items to be recalled first, after 
which they inhibit their own representations using recmTent inhibitory feedback, so that less 
active items can also be recalled in the order of their relative activity (Grossberg, 1978a, 1978b, 
1982; Koch and Ullman, 1985; Page and Norris, 1998). 
A number of articles have modeled such item-and-order working memories to explain data about 
fi'ee recall (Bradski et a!., 1994; Grossberg, 1978a, 1978b; Page and Nonis, 1998), reaction time 
during sequential motor performance (Boardman and Bullock, 1991; Grossberg and Kuperstein, 
1986/1989), errors in serial item and order recall that are due to rapid attention shifts (Grossberg 
and Stone, 1986a), e!Tors and reaction times during lexical priming and episodic memmy 
experiments (Grossberg and Stone, 1986b; McLennan et a!., 2003), data conceming word 
superiority, phonemic restoration, and backward effects on speech perception and word 
recognition (Cohen and Grossberg, 1986; Grossberg and Myers, 2000), etc. All these working 
memmy models satisfy two simple postulates (Bradski et a!., 1994; Grossberg, 1978a, 1978b ): 
The key postulate, called the LTM Invariance Principle proposes how working memories, which 
encode a type of STM, enable unitized representations of lists of items to be stably learned and 
stored in L TM. Thus STM and L TM are linked, but in a way not described by the authors, and 
one that does not conflate their different roles. For example, after learning the words MY and 
SELF, suppose that the word MYSELF is temporarily stored in working memory for the first 
time. How does a listener learn a new word representation for MYSELF without erasing the 
previously learned word representations for MY and SELF fi·om LTM? When such learning 
occurs in an unsupervised fashion in real time, as it does when a child learns a language, a poorly 
designed working memory could easily cause catastrophic forgetting of MY and SELF when 
learning MYSELF. 
The second postulate requires that the maximal total activity of the working memory is finite 
and, indeed, independent of the total number of active cells. This postulate implies the limited 
capacity ("the number of pointers"; see p. 2) of working memory: Since total working memory 
activity cannot increase indefinitely with the number of activated cells, some cells must be 
inhibited to enable other cell activities to be stored. 
Such working memories are called STORE (Sustained Temporal Order REcmTent) models. 
Remarkably, specialized recurrent on-center off-surround networks satisfY both STORE 
postulates. Recu!Tent on-center off-su!Tound networks are ubiquitous in the brain because they 
enable distributed input patterns to be processed without a loss of sensitivity by their target cells 
(Grossberg, 1980). Thus, designing a working memory reduces to specializing an ancient neural 
design. This design is not, however, the same as the design of LTM at the synapses which 
connect cells at which STM occurs. 
Prope1ties of synchrony, attention, and consciousness naturally emerge in neural systems which 
respect these differences between STM and LTM (Grossberg, 1999). 
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